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Abstract
Background: In spite of massive efforts to generalize efficient prevention, such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets
(ITN) or long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs), malaria remains prevalent in many countries and ITN/LLINs are still
only used to a limited extent.
Methods: This study proposes a new model for malaria economic analysis by combining economic epidemiology
tools with the literature on poverty traps. A theoretical model of rational protective behaviour in response to
malaria is designed, which includes endogenous externalities and disease characteristics. Survey data available for
Uganda provide empirical support to the theory of prevalence-elastic protection behaviours, once endogeneity
issues related to epidemiology and poverty are solved.
Results: Two important conclusions emerge from the model. First, agents increase their protective behaviour when
malaria is more prevalent in a society. This is consistent with the literature on "prevalence-elastic behaviour".
Second, a ‘malaria trap’ defined as the result of malaria reinforcing poverty while poverty reduces the ability to deal
with malaria can theoretically exist and the conditions of existence of the malaria trap are identified.
Conclusions: These results suggest the possible existence of malaria traps, which provides policy implications.
Notably, providing ITN/LLINs at subsidized prices is not sufficient. To be efficient an ITN/LLINs dissemination
campaigns should include incentive of the very poor for using ITN/LLINs.
Keywords: Protective behaviours, Poverty, Economic epidemiology, Malaria, ITN
Background
Historically, in absence of protection tools, malaria
persisted in large regions of the world [1,2]. Economic
development is also linked to malaria elimination and the
bidirectional relationship between malaria and development
has been extensively discussed in the economic literature
[3-6]. More recently it has been shown that insecticide-
treated mosquito nets and long-lasting insecticidal nets
(ITN/LLINs) are efficient preventive tools [7-11], and
this has triggered ambitious campaigns of ITN/LLINs
dissemination, with the expectation that such campaign
would help eliminate/eradicate malaria [12,13]. However, in
spite of their efficiency, ITN/LLINs are only partially used
for malaria prevention by the populations, and this
behaviour could hinder malaria elimination/eradication
[13]. A malaria trap defined as the result of malaria redu-
cing economic output (reinforcing poverty), while poverty
reduces the ability to deal with malaria, could be one pos-
sible explanation of this paradox as, even in countries with
high risk populations, the use of ITN remains low [13,14].
In recent economic literature [15], it has been argued
that there could exist a poverty trap associated with a
dynamic interaction between a disease prevalence and
poverty: disease prevalence increases poverty, while poverty
increases the susceptibility to infectious diseases. However,
this approach has been essentially based on empirical esti-
mates of macroeconomic relations between income GDP
per capita (Gross Domestic Product) and infectious disease
burden (DALYs, Disability Adjusted Life Years). This kind
of result has been used to advocate disease protection
campaigns, e.g. distribution of ITN/LLINs at subsidized
prices [16]. Following this line of arguments, the existence
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of a malaria trap, as previously defined, is plausible.
Analysing the negative impact of the disease on productivity
[17-19] provides some empirical evidence of the influence
of malaria on poverty, although the magnitude of this
influence is debated. The link between malaria and poverty
may be also more indirect. Indeed, it has been shown
empirically that malaria significantly reduces children
cognitive capacity [20,21]; hence, malaria can prevent
extreme poverty eradication, insofar as education is one of
the basic ingredients of poverty alleviation policies. Notably,
standard pro-poor policies, such as the development of
publicly-subsidized primary education, may fail in regions
where the prevalence of malaria is high [22]. Thus the
assumption of a malaria trap in regions characterized by
extreme poverty with low educational attainment and high
malaria incidence should be seriously considered. In the
presence of a malaria trap, standard pro-poor policies that
are usually advocated, such as the subsidy of protection
devices on the one hand, and the subsidy of education on
the other hand, may fail. The aim of this work was to
develop a model combining an analysis of human
protective behaviours with a classical representation
of the epidemiological malaria transmission, and to test
the conclusions of this model.
Methods
In order to evaluate the poverty related-malaria trap,
the basic epidemiological model of malaria transmis-
sion, in absence of protection, was reminded. Second,
an economic model was developed on the basis of
the epidemiological one, studying model’s behaviour
at steady-state. Third, predictions of the model was
tested based on Demographic and Health Survey data
from Uganda [23].
Epidemiological model in absence of protection
A standard epidemiological model of malaria was built,
with transmission of malaria between a population of
humans and a population of mosquitoes [24]. In order
to simplify the framework, the usual assumptions have
been made, i.e. constant population sizes (human and
mosquito) over time, uniform contacts between human and
mosquitoes, ignorance of superinfection and immunity.
Within the life-time period of humans, malaria prevalence
among humans and mosquitoes reaches a steady state. This
leads, in absence of protection, to equations based on the
McDonald and Ross malaria transmission model [24].
The time variation of malaria prevalence among humans
can be defined in a simplified way as:
_X ¼ mabZ 1−Xð Þ−rX ð1Þ
where m is the vector density (ratio of mosquitoes
per human), a is the number of bits per unit of time
and per mosquito, b is the proportion of infected
bites that produce infection among humans, Z is the
proportion of infectious mosquitoes, and r is the
clearance rate of malaria in humans.
Similarly, the time variation of the proportion of
infectious mosquitoes, can be written as:
_Z ¼ acX e−gn−Zð Þ−gZ ð2Þ
where c is the proportion of bites on infectious humans
that produce infection among mosquitoes, g is the death
rate of mosquitoes, and n is the length of sporogonic cycle.
Assuming that the time period of life is long enough,
malaria prevalence reaches a steady state equilibrium
defined by [24]:
Q Xð Þ ¼
mab acXe
−gn
gþacX
r þmab acXe
−gn
gþacX
¼
bEIR
r þ bEIR
ð3Þ
where EIR is the entomological inoculation rate classically
defined such as:
EIR ¼ maZ ¼
ma2cXe−gn
g þ acX
In what follows (after protection through ITN/LLIN),
the parameter m will become itself a variable. The
function Q(X, m) is concave, and characterized by the
following properties:
Q 0;mð Þ ¼ 0
Q 1;mð Þ < 1

And its slope at origin, is equal to
∂Q 0;mð Þ
∂X
¼
ma2bce−gn
rg
¼ R0 ð4Þ
This number, R0, is classically called, in the McDonald
and Ross tradition, the “basic reproduction number”
[25,26]. As demonstrated elsewhere, if R0 is below or
equal to 1, then Q(X,m) converges towards the trivial
disease free stable steady state. This case is not considered
in what follows, as it does not coincide with the persistence
of malaria in large regions of the developing world.
Conversely, if R0 is higher than 1, then Q(X,m) converges
towards a stable steady state characterized by a strictly
positive prevalence of malaria. In what follows, Q(X,m) will
be considered as the functional relationship between the
prevalence and contagious persons, at steady state, also
depending on the vector density m. This vector density will
depend on protection behavior against mosquitoes.
Economic epidemiological model with protection
When the basic reproduction number R0 is higher
than 1, using protection tools could nevertheless
reduce malaria transmission [24], and then, the trivial
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disease free stable steady state could be reached. This is the
rationale of ITN/LLINs dissemination policies. In order to
assess this possibility, a model of protection behavior has
been added to the previous epidemiological model. This
behavioral model, as described below, is based on economic
mechanisms. Peoples adopt a certain behavior: use of an
insecticide-treated net (h= 1) or exposure to malaria risk
(h= 0). It is supposed that the only means by which a
person can prevent himself from parasitic infection is to
sleep under an ITN/LLIN (even if a person can be infected
during the first part of the night). As a first assumption, the
use of an ITN/LLIN was supposed to provide complete
protection from malaria infection. This assumption has
been relaxed in Additional file 1 without affecting the main
findings of the model. At any time, depending on the use of
ITN before, the health status of the individual, σ(h) can take
one of two values: susceptible, σ(h) = S, or infected, σ(h) = I.
The probability of being infected at any time, conditionally
to the absence of protection before, can then be written as:
πI ¼ P σ hð Þ ¼ I=h ¼ 0ð Þ ð5Þ
If H is the proportion of population using ITN/LLIN,
among the (1-X) uninfected persons, the proportion of
infected persons can be simply written as:
X ¼ 1−Hð ÞπI ð6Þ
Furthermore the density of mosquitoes in contact to
humans, is affected by the presence of ITN/LLIN used
by a proportion H of the population. First, as the contact
between mosquito and human is more difficult, the
denominator of the mosquito density decreases, being
now the proportion 1 – H of non-protected population.
Second, as ITN/LLINs do not only protect humans,
from anopheles bites, but also kill mosquitoes (knock
down effect), the numerator (the number of mosquitoes)
decreases with H. Hence m can be written as follows:
m Hð Þ ¼
m 0ð Þ
1−H
1−γ Hð Þð Þ ð7Þ
Where γ(H) is the proportion of mosquitoes killed by
the use of ITN/LLINs, an increasing function of H. Note
that, the EIR is then a decreasing function of H. It fol-
lows that, at the steady state:
πI ¼ Q X;m Hð Þð Þ ð8Þ
In order to complete the model, the determinants of H
were specified in a next step. At the microeconomic
level, the choice of protection is determined by maximizing
the expected utility of each individual. The decision h of
protection (h = 1 for protection, h = 0 for non-protection)
affects individuals’ utility through two channels: (i) an
expected positive impact on his/her health status in case of
protection and (ii) a private cost, called κ. This cost can be
interpreted as the shortfall of paying for protection.
This broad definition includes the opportunity cost of
protection and depends on the marginal utility of personal
income. In other words, the private cost of the ITN/LLIN,
includes direct, indirect and opportunity costs, such as
paying the market price of ITN/ILLNs (direct costs),
transportation costs to get them or costs related to social
ostracism (indirect costs). Opportunity costs are the costs
of using them for protection rather than using them for
an economically productive activity, or the cost equal
to what an individual must give up in order to use an
ITN/LLIN, which he/she would otherwise never use.
Hence protection decision is described through the
following maximization program:
maxhE u σ hð Þð Þ½ −κW ωð Þh ð9Þ
Where u (S) or u (I) are the utility levels attached to the
health status (susceptible, σ(h) = S, or infected, σ(h) = I, thus
depending on h, the use of a protection), with 0 < u(I) < u
(S); ω is the individual income; W (ω) is the marginal utility
of the income, supposed as usual to decrease with income
[27], and κ is the private cost of the ITN/LLIN.
The expected utility (the expected positive impact of
using ITN/LLIN on the health status) can be estimated
using the following probabilities of being susceptible or
infected, conditionally to the use of protection:
st
P σ hð Þ ¼ S=h ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
P σ hð Þ ¼ S=h ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1−πI
P σ hð Þ ¼ I=h ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ πI
ð10Þ
In addition, it is assumed that there exists a minimum
subsistence level such as in the case a Stone-Geary utility
function [28-30]. This implies that the marginal utility of
income W (ω) goes to infinity for all individuals at (or
below) the minimum subsistence level, which is classically
called the extreme poverty line Ω (i.e. the minimum
level of income deemed adequate in a given country
for an individual or a household). In other words, the
extreme poverty line is an income level below which
nobody can afford an ITN/LLIN, i.e. h = 0.
As in standard economic epidemiological models, the
individual will use protective tools when W (ω) is lower
than the expected utility loss associated with the risk of
infection that occurs in the absence of protection:
E u σ 1ð Þð Þ−u σ 0ð Þð Þ½ ≥ κW ωð Þ ð11Þ
According to Equation (9) and the three probabilities
of Equation (10) it follows that:
h ¼ 1 if and only if u Sð Þ− 1−πIð Þu Sð Þ−πIu Ið Þ≥κW ωð Þ
ð12Þ
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A person will use ITN/LLIN if the utility of being
non-infected is greater than the utility of paying for a
protective tool, according to the income and the probability
of being infected without using any protection. Hence,
protection occurs if and only if:
πI≥
κW ωð Þ
u Sð Þ−u Ið Þ
ð13Þ
This Equation shows that there is a threshold probability
of infection above which a person engages in protection.
The key point in this approach is that the threshold
probability of infection depends on the marginal income
utility loss associated with using the ITN/LLIN, κW(ω),
with respect to the net value attached to susceptible health
status, u(S)–u(I). This threshold depends on the individual
income ω. The threshold function, linking πI to ω, termed
C(ω), is monotonic and C ' (ω) < 0, as the function W() is
monotonic and W ' (ω) < 0. In addition, the function C() is
increasing with κ. Consequently:
h ¼ 1 if ω≥C−1 πIð Þ
h ¼ 0 else

ð14Þ
and the income threshold conditioning protection, C− 1(πI),
decreases with κ. Knowing individual protection behaviors,
the aggregated level of protection H (the percentage
of protected persons) can be computed by integration
as follows:
H ¼
Z þ∞
C−1 πIð Þ
f ωð Þdω ¼ 1−F C−1 πIð Þ
 
ð15Þ
Where f is the probability density function of ω (and F
the associated cumulative density function), describing
the income distribution of the population. Equations (6),
(8) and (15) fully describe the dynamics of H and πI as a
function of X.
Prevalence-elastic behaviour at the steady-state vicinity
Nearby the steady-state, the dynamics corresponds to a
standard prevalence-elastic behaviour of protection
(positive malaria prevalence elasticity), where H is an
increasing function of X, because it is increasing with πI
(Equations (8) and (15)). Note that as a consequence,
nearby the steady-state, X is not necessarily monotonic
in πI: protection behaviors and epidemiological dynamics
go in opposite directions. Indeed, combining Equations
(6) and (15) it follows that:
X ¼ F C−1 πIð Þ
 
πI ð16Þ
As a result, this is consistent with standard results in
economic epidemiology [31]. Thus, Equations (15) and
(16) provide us with some economic determinants of
protection at individual and aggregated levels, that could
be possibly tested (as studied in next section). For a
given probability of infection in absence of protection,
protection decreases with the unit costs of ITN/LLIN, κ
(through the function C− 1). It also decreases with
poverty, as the poorer the individuals, the higher their
marginal utility of income.
Long term properties: conditions of persistence of a
malaria trap
The main question to be solved, concerning the long-term
properties of this model at the steady-state, is whether a
malaria trap can persist in the long run, in spite of the
availability of ITN/LLINs as protection tools since the
higher the unit cost κ of ITN/LLINs, the lower the
protection. This is why ITN/LLINs programs are usually
based on subsidized ITN/LLINs prices. Let us then
consider the best case of almost full subsidization, when
κ→ 0 (i.e. the extreme case being free distribution).
Conditions under which, for any positive unit cost κ,
the malaria trap persists are given below:
Proposition
For any κ > 0, when κ→ 0 the long term equilibrium
corresponds to a malaria trap, if and only if:
R0 >
1
F Ωð Þ 1−m F Ωð Þð Þð Þ
ð17Þ
where F(Ω) is the proportion of persons under the extreme
poverty line in a population, also called the extreme poverty
incidence. Note that m depends on H, the proportion of
protected persons (Equation (7)), which depends itself on
income (Equation (15)), and, thus, on the extreme poverty
incidence.
Proof
For κ→ 0, individuals use protection if and only if they
are above the extreme poverty line. Given Eq. (6), (8)
and (15), it follows that:
H→ 1 − F(Ω), i.e. only persons over the extreme poverty
line will be protected then, X→ F(Ω)πI i.e. only persons
under the extreme poverty line will be infected at rate πI
and
πI→Q X;m 1−F Ωð Þð Þð Þ ð18Þ
Thus, when κ→ 0, the long term equilibrium can be
mathematically analyzed along the same line as in the
pure epidemiological model at the steady-state, after
substitution of function Q by:
F Ωð ÞQ X;m 1−F Ωð Þð Þð Þ ð19Þ
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This implies that the malaria trap persists if and only if the
slope of this function at origin (X = 0) is higher than 1, i.e.:
R0 ¼ F Ωð Þ
m 1−F Ωð Þð Þa2bc
rg
> 1 QED ð20Þ
Given κ → 0 and H → 1 − F(Ω), as the vector density
m is a decreasing function of H, the higher the incidence
of extreme poverty F(Ω), the higher the risk of persistence
of a malaria trap. Hence, a malaria trap will persist for
high enough values of the basic reproduction number R0
and of the extreme poverty incidence F(Ω), even when
ITN/LLINs are highly subsidized. In the extreme case
where all the population is at or below the extreme
poverty line, the condition above corresponds exactly to
the basic reproduction number, and hence this policy is
certainly ineffective (R0 > 1).
One could argue that if ITN/LLINs were provided at
no cost to individuals (κ = 0), then all individuals including
the extreme poor, would use them. Distribution of
ITN/LLINs for free would then possibly be a much
more efficient policy to reduce malaria, compared to
selling ITN/LLINs at a subsidized price. This is in
line with randomized experiments that found that free
distribution dramatically increases use of ITN/LLINs
(as well as other important products for the poor),
compared to charging even very small user fees [32].
However, the assumption κ = 0 is merely theoretical,
even though it can be possibly obtained in controlled
experiments, as in practice κ is not merely the price of
ITN/LLINs: it involves also all opportunity costs attached
to using them for other productive activities. Selling,
exchanging, discarding or re-using the material from
ITN/LLINs is not uncommon. For instance, misuse of
ITN/LLINs for profit (drying fish and fishing) has
been observed by Lake Victoria [33] and in Zambia
[34]. In some cases, nets have even been turned into
wedding dresses and water filters.
Predictability of the model
The previous model describes protection behaviours and
the existence of theoretical conditions under which a
malaria trap persists. As stated above, protection should (a)
increase with prevalence of malaria (i.e. positive malaria
prevalence elasticity), (b) decrease with an increase of
economic cost of protection and (c) decrease with an
increase of the incidence of extreme poverty. Prediction (a)
is testable with existing individual data as examined below.
It corresponds to relation (1) of Figure 1. Prediction (b) is
hardly testable for lack of data on cost of protection at
individual level. However, prediction (c) is testable, and
provides a way to study economic determinants of protec-
tion. Finally, the model predicts that, in a country with high
extreme poverty incidence, the policy of dissemination of
subsidized ITN/LLINs, sold at a small but strictly positive
unit price, can be ineffective, insofar as the corrected basic
reproduction number is increasing with extreme poverty
incidence. As classically done, three regression models
(ordinary least square estimators, OLS) have been used to
estimate explanatory variables of (i) poverty, (ii) malaria
prevalence, (iii) use of protection. Each of these 3 models
includes, as predictor, the two remaining variables, plus
cofactors to be adjusted on. But, none of these models takes
into account endogeneity, which leads to estimation bias.
Endogeneity is used in economics to describe the presence
of an endogenous explanatory variable in a multiple regres-
sion model, i.e. a variable that is correlated with the error
term, either because of an omitted variable, measurement
Malaria risk should influence the use of an ITN/LLIN: prevalence elastic behavior.
The efficiency of ITN/LLINs to reduce malaria prevalence is established.
Poverty is certainly influencing ITN/LLIN use through costs or opportunity costs. ITN 
could have an indirect effect on poverty through & 
& The relationship between malaria and poverty is certainly bidirectional.
Malaria
ITN/LLIN 
Use
Poverty 
1 2 3
4
5
1
2
3
4 5
2 4
Figure 1 The relationship between ITN/LLINs use, malaria and poverty.
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error or reverse causality [35]. Indeed, classical regression
models explaining malaria prevalence and protection use
are certainly biased due to endogeneity. As illustrated in
Figure 1 reverse causality is actually a highly plausible bias.
In order to solve this problem, instrumental variables
techniques have been used to deal with these potential
biases [35-38]. Consequently, given the strong possibility
of endogeneity of poverty incidence, malaria prevalence
and protection, and given that the error terms are not
necessarily independent of each other, the 3SLS estimates
are useful, providing estimates that are free of endogeneity
bias. The complete system of structural equations was
estimated with a heteroskedastic-efficient 3SLS two step
generalized method of moments (3SLS GMM) described
by Wooldridge [35]. The system is illustrated in a simplified
way with Equation (21) below and Figure 1:
F Ωð Þ ¼ α1 þ β1aX þ β1b Poverty Incidence IVsþ β1cRegionsþ ε1
X ¼ α2 þ β2aF Ωð Þ þ β2bH þ β2cMalaria IVsþ β2d Regionsþ ε2
H ¼ α3 þ β3aX þ β3bF Ωð Þ þ β3c Protection IVsþ β3d Regionsþ ε3
8<
:
ð21Þ
Where the βs are the coefficients associated with the
corresponding factors (or vectors of factors) included in
each equation, IVs stand for specific Instrumental Variables
enabling to identify a causal effect (described below),
Regions are a set of dummy variables in order to control for
confounders linked to malaria regional control programs,
and εs are the standard disturbance terms. Other variables
remain unchanged with respect to previous notations.
Instrumental variables for endogenous variables are
distance to nearest market and remote location (for poverty:
the poorest of the poor), altitude, longitude, latitude (for
malaria prevalence), distance to nearest health center, % of
houses sprayed against mosquitoes in last 12 months (for
ITN use). Similar geographic instruments were already used
for malaria prevalence [5,20] and the availability of health
facilities is generally a good candidate as instrumental
variable for endogenous health indicators [39]. Household
distance to nearest market is supposed to independently
affect economic activity and resources as in other examples.
In a three-equation model, the order condition for identifi-
cation requires that there is at least two endogenous or
exogenous variables excluded from each equation, which is
the case here [40]. The Hansen J test was used to test
the over-identifying restrictions i.e. the validity of the
instrumental variables [35]. A rejection of the null
hypothesis implies that the instruments are not satisfying
the orthogonality conditions required for their employment
(i.e. they are uncorrelated with the error term of the
estimated equation). The predictions of the model have
been tested on DHS (Demographic and Health Surveys)
household members data from Uganda (2009) aggregated
at the community/village level. Note that DHS are generally
not longitudinal surveys. Unfortunately, the selected
clusters or individuals within a same country generally
change from one survey to another. To date, MIS (Malaria
Indicator Surveys), that provide at the same time malaria
infection prevalence (through Paracheck tests) and ITNs
use for children under five, are extremely recent and cover
only five African countries [41]: Liberia (2008–2009)
Angola (2006), Senegal (2008–2009), Uganda (2009) and
Tanzania (2007–2008), hence Ugandan data were used [23].
The choice of the survey highly depends on the kind of
information available in each survey. Potential reliable
instrumental variables were not available in Angola, Liberia,
Tanzania and Senegal. In Uganda, 28.67% of the population
lives with less than the threshold of $1.25 a day (in PPP
[42]). The extreme poverty line was, therefore, defined
using this threshold and the wealth index provided by DHS.
Poverty incidence was calculated/estimated relatively to this
extreme poverty line. Malaria prevalence was defined as the
percentage of people tested positive for malaria with RDTs
amongst the population tested in the survey. An ever-
treated net is (i) a factory-treated long-lasting insecticidal
mosquito net that does not require any further treatment,
OR (ii) a factory net, with or without an insecticide kit,
which has subsequently been soaked with insecticide at any
time, OR (iii) a homemade net which has subsequently been
soaked with insecticide at any time. Note that ordinary
least-square models (OLS) have been kept in order to
highlight the endogeneity bias.
Application results
Table 1 shows that reasons generally advanced in the
literature for not using the nets, do not hold in the Uganda
DHS report where these questions were asked. The main
reason of not using nets was the heat (for 15% of the sam-
ple). Note that, ITN/LLIN are more used against nuisance
of Culex or Aedes than Anopheles. OLS regression (Table 2),
not taking into account endogeneity, showed no significant
prevalence-elastic behaviour (i.e. relationship (1) of Figure 1):
protection behaviour was not significantly related to malaria
prevalence, nor poverty incidence (Table 2 column 1),
Table 1 Subjective reasons for not using the nets in Uganda
Reason for not using the nets: Too hot Don't like smell No mosquitoes Net too old
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
15.7% 84.3% 1.6% 98.4% 6.8% 98.31% 11.4% 88.6%
Percentage of households with at least one mosquito net that was not slept under the previous night, and among those, percentage reporting various reasons for
not using a net for sleeping the previous night, by background characteristics [23].
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adjusted on regions, but malaria prevalence was signifi-
cantly related to poverty incidence (β=0.376, p<0.001)
(Table 2 column 2 and 3). Furthermore, protection behav-
iour changed through region, as well as malaria prevalence
and poverty incidence. Conversely, once the endogeneity
problems were solved, a prevalence-elastic relationship
between malaria and protection was found: protection
behaviour was significantly related to malaria prevalence
(β=0.438, p=0.012), and negatively related to poverty
incidence (β=−0.323, p=0.096) (Table 2, column 4). Malaria
prevalence remains significantly related to poverty incidence
at a higher magnitude (β=0.543, p<0.001). Prevalence-elastic
Table 2 Prevention, malaria and poverty in Uganda: OLS and 3SLS GMM regressions results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 3SLS GMM
Dep Var is % using an
ever treated net last
night in the village
Dep var is
malaria prevalence
in the village
Dep var is
poverty incidence
in the village
Dep Var is % using an
ever treated net last
night in the village
Dep var is malaria
prevalence in
the village
Dep var is
poverty incidence
in the village
Malaria - −0.044 - - −0.862*** -
Prevention (0.130) (0.308)
Poverty −0.046 0.376*** - −0.323* 0.543*** -
Incidence (0.078) (0.096) (0.194) (0.132)
Malaria −0.022 - 0.242*** 0.438** - 0.302**
Prevalence (0.063) (0.067) (0.175) (0.124)
Intercept 0.208*** 0.400*** −0.013 0.062 1.364*** −0.290***
(0.044) (0.058) (0.047) (0.078) (0.174) (0.064)
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
R-squared 0.379 0.550 0.668 - - -
The coefficients attached to each variable are presented (standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses). All regressions include regional
dummies. ***denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. The Hansen J Test of overidentifying restrictions shows that the
instruments are well identified in 3SLS GMM regressions (Hansen's J chi2= 12.247; p value = 0.140). A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the instruments
are not satisfying the orthogonality conditions required for their employment (i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term of the estimated Equation).
Malaria Trap 
x: Poverty Incidence  
y:
 M
al
ar
ia
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e
Malaria as a function of poverty 
Malaria = 0,315 + 0,596 Poverty
Poverty as a function of malaria 
Poverty = 0,275 + 0,302 Malaria  
Figure 2 Malaria prevalence and poverty incidence in Uganda, solving partially the three-equations system.
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behaviour was defined in economic epidemiology as an in-
creased protection behaviour in response to an increase in
disease prevalence. Hence one of the questions tackled pre-
viously was how changing malaria affects protection? Re-
gression (4) of Table 2 thus confirmed a significant causal
positive effect of malaria on protection (ITN use), as far as
the instrumentation strategy (use of instrumental variable
for adjustments) is validated by usual tests. The Hansen J
Test of over-identifying restrictions showed that the
instruments were valid in 3SLS GMM regressions (Table 2).
Discussion
By developing economic and econometric approaches
on the basis of an epidemiological model, the poverty
related-malaria trap has been formally determined. The
combination of these three relations between protection,
malaria and extreme poverty is, therefore, plausible and
can lead to a malaria trap. Figure 2 illustrates the linear
predictions of the relationship between malaria and poverty
from Uganda dataset, solving partially the three-equations
system (structural Equation (20)) to take into account the
endogeneity of protection. It highlights three results with
respect to possible traps.
First, for a poverty incidence equal to 0, malaria is
persisting. Second, malaria can only converge to a medium
or high equilibrium. Third, the intersection point between
the x-axis and the poverty curve (as a function of malaria)
is significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the intersection point
between the x-axis and the malaria curve (as a function of
poverty), which means that there is (at least) one stable
equilibrium, with medium/high incidence of malaria
and medium/high incidence of poverty. This stable
equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of the
two curves. Interestingly, the intersection between the
two curves is slightly higher than the average level of
malaria prevalence in Uganda (between 44% and 54%
according to the DHS report [23]) and to the average
incidence of poverty (28.67% according to the World Bank).
It is, therefore, highly probable that communities/villages
below this threshold will converge toward this point (i.e. a
relatively higher prevalence of malaria/poverty equilibrium)
and that communities/villages above this threshold will
converge as well toward this point (i.e. a relatively lower
prevalence of malaria/poverty equilibrium).
Social influences on individuals’ decisions may lead to
malaria trap. This malaria trap can theoretically exist
and the conditions of its existence have been identified,
which provides policy implications. Particularly, the use
of ITNs by the very poor should be subsidized, i.e. the
very poor people should not only be provided highly
subsidized ITNs, but they should be given incentive for
protection use (including financial award) to keep and
use their ITNs as suggested for immunization coverage
in other empirical randomized studies [43]. Otherwise,
they may rationally resell their ITNs on a parallel market
(or use them for other purposes) and then malaria
prevalence may stay high at equilibrium. It could be
relevant to implement this policy at the community
level in collaboration with community health workers,
insofar as the origin of the issue is related to the
presence of externalities that emerge at this community
level. Obviously, ITNs or LLINs distribution should be
complemented by insecticide spraying campaigns or other
vector control methods, to reduce the number of vectors,
and then the basic reproduction number. The model de-
scribed in this paper could be extended in many ways. It
would be interesting to distinguish asymptomatic infections
from symptomatic infections in this model. Other potential
external variables, such as drug and insecticide resistance,
climatic variability, population immunity, access to care
and other malaria preventive methods, could also be taken
into account in a more complex model. Nevertheless, the
result highlighted by this simple model has practical
implication for malaria control policies. Indeed, these
policies are based on combined actions, such as rapid diag-
nosis and Artemisinin Combination Therapy, preventive
treatments (Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention -SMC- and
Intermittent Preventive Therapy during Pregnancy -IPTp),
ITN/LLINs and environment management. The malaria
trap illustrated in this study has to be taken into account
when building malaria control policies.
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